how the Commission engages with civil society, and what, if any, role civil society has played within the unfolding Stabilisation and Association Process (SAp) and EU enlargement. The Commission's engagement with civil society stems from an understanding that the enlargement process, although principally an elite-driven process, derives at least some measure of legitimacy from the input of non state actors and groups which are closer to the citizens of prospective member states. Civil society support has been part of the EU accession framework since the mid 1990s and has developed in quite specific ways as a result of different but quite purposeful types of engagement on the part of both EU and other external actors. The Commission's approach to enlargement and SAP is highlighted as the most important element of the EU's 'Europeanisation' strategy for enlargement candidate states, which has seen an effort to 'modernise', 'democratise', 'pluralise' and transform the most fragile part of Europe and progressively connect it to the mainstream landscape of EU politics. The chapter argues, however, that the Commission's approach to the Western Balkans, consistent with that employed during eastern enlargement and the 'output' legitimacy model of EU governance, has ultimately been a top-down one, with a preference for engagement with state actors and hierarchical rather than horizontal modes of communication and decision making. Although civil society has featured strongly in Commission rhetoric about the 'transformative potential' of an EU-oriented Western Balkans, EU policy has in fact helped to neutralise any meaningful contribution by civil society actors as a substantive partner in governance. And although the Commission has at least broadened out the circle of participation in enlargement/SAp to include civil society as a stakeholder, the Commission's engagement with the Western Balkans has been accession driven rather than community centred. This means that civil society has continued to play a subordinate part in the transforming landscape within the region.
CIVIL SOCIETY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Although the EU is often identified as an elitist structure of power, scholarship has increasingly focused on transnational advocacy networks centred on the EU, and both the horizontal and vertical interactions provoked by civil society activity. The concept of civil society entered the debate on EU governance comparatively late and largely as a result of the EU's extended legitimacy crisis from the early 1990s on. 2 The EU here is understood as a transnational and multilevel political opportunity structure (POS), which acts to structure patterns of civil society mobilisation and access to decision makers. 3 One of the most sophisticated recent contributions to the literature comes from Beate Kohler Koch 4 who analyses the multiple functions performed by civil society organisations across the European Union. In particular she identifies a 'performative function' centred on the formation and reformation of civil society 'through discourse and interaction in the public sphere'. Accompanying this there is a 'representative function', which involves 'making civil society visible and giving societal interests a voice'. Here CSOs are understood as mediators between the local and the supranational centre in Brussels, echoing local points of view and policy concerns, bringing a diversity of views to the policy making table, and thus contributing both to input and output legitimacy. Civil society actors face considerable constraints, however, when seeking to influence EU policy. They are constrained by the significant level of resources required to cultivate relations, prepare policy submissions and attend meetings. Although the European Commission has consistently held to a pluralist understanding of civil society, which includes all voluntary and non-profit organisations that
give voice to the concerns of citizens in addition to market related actors, the evidence from the integration process suggests that this pluralism is a highly qualified and narrowly interpreted one.
Research indicates that there is a significant gap between the official EU discourse about its relationship with civil society and its actual practice of consulting citizens and their representatives.
Civil dialogue, for example, has seen a tendency on the part of the Commission to avoid interaction with civil society on controversial issues. 5 The Commission's preference for working with and through elites within civil society organisations has been well documented. Thus EU NGOs, despite achieving visibility and prominence in carrying out their performative and representative functions, have also been categorised as lacking the critical distance required to mobilise for a radical shift in EU policy and of participating in consensus-oriented consultation processes devoid of substantive opportunities for deliberation. EU social NGOs in particular have been characterised as elite focused with weak links to grassroot constituents. Scholars have also demonstrated that EU funding and project support to NGOs has often proved both conditional and highly selective. 6 For sceptics of civil society efficacy this provides evidence of civil society co-optation and an inability to maintain independence from EU policy proposals, which helps it to set and shape the enlargement policy agenda. Although, as in the general integration framework, it seeks to anticipate, incorporate and adjust for the specific concerns of member states, and increasingly the European Parliament, it has often found itself to be, almost by default, the sole policy entrepreneur and thus the best placed EU actor within the enlargement process.
It is important to understand that much of the Commission's power within the contemporary enlargement process evolved out of the early (uncertain) response by the EU to events in CEE in the early 1990s.
The extraordinary challenge that confronted the European Commission when it took on the task of managing EU relations with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe was quite unlike anything the Commission had previously faced in EU enlargement history. Although at many levels the Commission acted in conformity with Article 49 of the treaties -and thus as a classic bureaucratic agent of the member states of the EU -it seems clear that the Commission also managed to carve out for itself a very significant independent role within the eastern enlargement. In the first place it is responsible for most of the important formal policy proposals that shape the deepening of relations with candidate and prospective candidate states. The Commission is both able and willing to act as an agenda setter and so frame the parameters of EU policy toward the Western Balkan states. And although more often than not its choice is to operate through coalitions within the Council, it also frequently drives the EU agenda on key parts of the process.
Where formal prerogatives are absent the Commission uses what scholars term 'customary enlargement practice' to carve out an informal agenda setting role, framing problems and urging consensus where difficulties arise. Individual commissioners such as Gunter Verheügen and Olli Rehn frequently acted as political entrepreneurs, and proved to be both proactive and integral to enlargement outcomes. And the Commission itself, through its capacity building and compliance functions within the process, is the EU institutional actor closest to the candidate states throughout the process, providing advice, urging broader and deeper transposition of EU norms, and actively socialising candidate state public representatives into EU practice.
Viewed by the candidate states as ever-demanding and frequently unreasonable in its insistence on full and unconditional implementation of the acquis, viewed by the member states as too accommodating of candidate state preferences, the Commission often treads a thin line between process manager and political entrepreneur. In its engagement with the candidate states, imaginative framing of policy proposals within the EU, and not inconsiderable diplomatic skill in pushing the sometimes reluctant member states toward completion of the negotiations, the Commission performs the type of role which, if indeed unglamorous and hidden from the European public, is integral to the success story that enlargement has proved. It is thus quite certain that the Commission acts as a key 'driver' or 'motor' of the enlargement process. A role that developed out of the vacuum created by the fall of the Berlin Wall has evolved into a functional, normative and agenda setting role that now dominates the enlargement framework in the Western Balkans.
The eastern enlargement was the first such accession process to exhibit any kind of official role for civil society. The process of including civil society was, however, slow and evolutionary, and not without contradictions. In the aftermath of the 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe civil society played an important, if often neglected role, in providing an early legitimising rationale for the EU's eastern enlargement process. 12 Indeed in some respects the prominence of civil society actors in toppling communist regimes in the late 1980s may have led to unrealisable expectations about the potential reach and influence of civil society in reconstructing and consolidating democratic institutions and associational life in post communist Europe. In the developing enlargement framework it was the EU aid regime that provided the first opportunity structure for civil society participation in the political context. And crucially this participation developed out of specific interaction with the European Commission, as the latter took on the role of enlargement process manager on behalf of the EU.
In 1991 it was simply stated that PHARE (the French acronym for 'Poland and Hungary:
Assistance for Restructuring Economies') assistance contained a general commitment to recognise the value of non-governmental organisations while implementing PHARE projects. In 1992, a special PHARE democracy programme was launched on the initiative of the European Parliament, in order to counter the exclusive emphasis on market based reforms. The programme aimed to support the establishment of political and civil institutions crucial for the achievement of political consensus and stability. Later studies would show that most of this support went into the 'development of NGOs'.
The objectives of PHARE's civil society programmes were 'to strengthen the capacity of leading institutions and to assist them in expanding the range of their activities, increasing their self-reliance and enhancing their participation in society and their support of NGOs'. 13 The key here is that this engagement evolved as an element of Commission policy and was increasingly linked to the Commission's priorities rather than local civil society actors' priorities. Adaptation to EU norms and effective compliance with the acquis framed the Commission's approach to civil society. Thus it was accession driven rather than demand driven; Commission driven rather than locally driven. This would set the pattern for civil society participation in EU enlargement programmes which has continued to this day within the Western Balkans (and Turkey).
THE COMMISSION AND CIVIL SOCIETY
The role of civil society in legitimising EU governance has attracted growing attention within the EU's developing relations with the Western Balkans. The Commission's goal has been to engage both state and non-state actors in policy reform premised on ideas about good governance and building local capacity to cope with the EU acquis. It is crucial, however, to understand that the European Commission's engagement with civil society should be understood as a form of 'output' rather than 'input' legitimacy, where dialogue with 'specialised publics' takes place as a form of deliberation by specialist actors according to Eriksen. 14 Here policy consultations take the form of institutionalised contacts by which the Commission seeks to obtain information covering both the subject issue and their position on proposed legislation from stakeholders and civil society groups. 15 Civil society acts as an intermediary between the citizen and the state, making at least some contribution to reducing the so-called 'democratic deficit' in the enlargement domain, but nevertheless from a position which is distinctly subordinate to state actors. Civil society groups have been increasingly active in lobbying the EU over the last decade, but this involvement, even when successful, often fails to match the regularised and favoured input of private interest groups. And as Warleigh 16 points out, the EU's approach to civil society groups in the past has been open to question; the Commission in particular 'has been guilty of trying to limit consultation to favourite NGOs which will essentially defend the Commission's policy preferences, and sometimes even its role in the institutional process itself'. This has led, as Adam Fagan 17 points out, to a 'rather audacious conflation of democratic civil society with externally funded professional NGOs'.
The Commission clearly orientates consultation with civil society actors towards output legitimacy, however, by framing the boundaries of discussion and room for compromise available to participating actors. It is clear that 'in the design of the consultative fora the members are invited as experts, and in principle not on behalf of their organisations' in any specific representative capacity. A characteristic feature is that they are easily 'turned into specialised spaces' where 'knowledge of a policy field is more important' than input legitimacy criteria. 18 In this kind of environment it is easy to see why different forms of 'cognitive dissonance' arise between the representatives of many civil society groups in Brussels and their constituency: they are effectively co-opted as experts and parts of an Civil society activities are essential for a mature democracy, the respect for human rights and the rule of law. Such activities enhance political accountability, stimulate and expand the space for discourse on societal choices and strengthen the consensus for a pluralistic society. By contributing to a more open, participatory and dynamic democracy, a lively and vibrant civil society is also conducive to tolerance and reconciliation. 20 The emphasis on tolerance and reconciliation' is clearly an acknowledgment that EU policy in the region has not to date produced the more benign, cooperative and pluralistic inter-communal environment that was hoped for in the aftermath of the Dayton settlement in 1995. This is especially the case in Kosovo and Bosnia where borders, status and sovereignty remain contested by a range of actors. While suggesting the EU possesses considerable power to influence local trajectories of development, it also qualifies this by asserting that this is usually subject to local interpretation and contestation. At a more concrete and practical level the Commission 21 suggests that:
A culture of acceptance and appreciation of the role played by civil society needs to be in place to allow civil society organisations to engage in an effective policy dialogue. Public consultation on policy initiatives and draft laws should become the general principle. The access of civil society to government support is frequently hindered by a lack of transparency and poorly developed allocation criteria.
The Commission again alludes strongly to the fundamental weaknesses of civil society in the region when stating that a key EU aim is to: 'strengthen their capacities and professionalism, allowing them to engage in an effective dialogue with public and private actors and to monitor developments in areas such as the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights'. 22 Alongside an enhanced role for civil society within the unfolding EU aid regime, a second key priority for the Commission has been to encourage and facilitate a more substantive framework of regional cooperation among CSOs. Although 'regionalism' has tended to be resisted by state actors within the enlargement framework, the Commission sees it as a positive vehicle supporting inter-state reconciliation and accelerated cross-border economic cooperation. Although the Commission has encouraged the transnational approach some CSOs have resisted such activity, for more or less the same reason as state actors (the fear that regionalism will dilute the bilateral relationship with Brussels). CSO transnationalism is especially evident in the groups which focus on human rights across the Western Balkans; these tend to be more universalistic and outward looking in their aims and modus operandi than other groups. In this sense they act -or have the potential to act -as a healthy counterweight to local actors which focus on a narrow range of particularistic, localised and sometimes patently chauvinistic demands. The damage wrought by particularism based on a perennialist conception of ethnic relations runs very deep in the Western Balkans region; civil society offers a channel for independent, moderate, and cooperative ideas in a context where state elites still tend to fall back on familiar nationalist tropes manifested in different forms of paranoia and 'groupthink'. Thus the opportunity for reconciliation and engagement of previously warring ethnonational sub-units can be facilitated by civil society dialogue with external sponsorship of the European Commission. A key aim here is a form of socialisation of such actors, not so much into a uniform or universalist way of thinking, but rather away from extremes of thinking and behaviour.
This applies both to the traditional approach of inside-outside negotiations and the more day to day informal practices at the regional level: civil society has a role in both but is much more visible in the latter than the former. It is important to acknowledge here that CSOs do not faithfully replicate the 'Brussels line' and policy agenda within the enlargement process; they provide a crucial independent, non-state voice and pressure on both domestic actors and the external actors within the framework. At times the very independence of local civil society actors is an asset for the Commission as it faces down domestic contestation of EU norms and the implementation of accession-driven legislation.
Civil society can thus act as a more acceptable (internal) channel of representation and norm diffusion This applies as much to parliamentarians as it does to civil society; in both cases it acts to reduce the democratic legitimation of the enlargement process and further distance citizens from political engagement. The Commission, whilst paying lip service to the goal of civil society inclusion, often acts in a functional capacity to curtail or reduce the actual input of CSOs as it seeks substantive results from candidate/SAp states which will advance the accession process. The argument most frequently proffered in defence of this approach is that the most important priority is reform along a defined EU trajectory and that success will empower civil society indirectly through better quality public administration and a more transparent and structurally secure criminal justice system.
Guided by this janus-faced approach, the Commission has consistently exhibited a tendency toward hierarchical differentiation and conference-centred rather than community-centred activity on the part of so-called 'elect' civil society groups. The professionalisation of community work and what has been termed 'NGO-isation' appears as a significant problem here. These groups are part of or over time become socialised into an elite transnational community centred on European integration practices: elites talk to themselves and do little to reduce the 'democratic deficit' said to characterise EU institutional politics. At its most extreme this is a world where civil society is not part of society but substitutes for society; organisations are essentially co-opted into an elite world of privilege and access and as such voluntarily dislodge themselves from their previous anchor in society.
In the Western Balkans this separation of civil society from society takes the form of 'international'
versus 'local', where many NGOs are staffed by foreign nationals; such organisations often maintain a two track salary scale whereby the 'internationals' get paid a 'Western' salary leaving their local employees to be paid in significantly lower amounts of local currency. This leads to the charge of professional NGOs 'masquerading as civil society' whilst failing to engage adequately with local actors and their concerns. 29 Granted this international NGO sector represents just one part of the civil society sphere in the region but it remains a crucially important one. The impression here is of a process of co-option of favoured civil society groups, which increasingly tend toward elite engagement in Brussels and in the process lose touch with their roots in local society in the Western
Balkans. The Commission's overriding priority of facilitating accession-driven 'capacity building' and governance reforms thus drives it to both co-opt and marginalise civil society whilst offering rhetorical blandishments centred on inclusion and participative democracy. Changing Societies. 32 Huntington's chief concerns here were with the relationship between state capacity and legitimation of the political process. He asserted that the two in fact could be separated: a country could grow and consolidate its institutions and stateness independent of their basis for legitimation. At the core of the Commission's approach to the enlargement and SAp framework is this desire to balance the capacity of Western Balkan elites to provide effective governance and an administrative and juridical system capable of adapting to the EU's legal norms whilst underpinning these efforts with a substantive role for civil society. Where civil society could and -normatively speaking -should bridge the gap between state action and citizen empowerment, the Commission has usually sided (following Huntington's precepts) with the imperative of achieving legal and administrative state compliance over any meaningful legitimation of those processes. Thus to some extent the enlargement/SAp regime has not just exacerbated existing tendencies toward elite capacity;
it has also contributed to a growing problem of a specifically local and regional 'democratic deficit', familiar from the European Union and its political process. The demands of the accession process in both CEE previously, and latterly, the Western Balkans has, for example, taken power away from national parliaments as the Commission sought speedy adaptation to EU norms and engaged heavily with executive actors rather than parliament and civil society. National parliaments have thus been convincingly depicted as 'victims' of the enlargement process in the same way as patterns of 'deepening' within the existing EU have also disempowered legislatures. 33 The evidence from the Western Balkans suggests that something similar is happening to civil society. Although the Commission, as the lead EU actor in the region, has aided and facilitated the civil society sector and sought to include it in public consultations and regional dialogue, these efforts have been accompanied by a sustained attachment to a top-down, elite-driven enlargement model: participation 'by the people' is envisaged as indirect and partial rather than direct and substantive. Thus the advance by civil society in the Western Balkans continues to exhibit a stop-start quality and the meaningful legitimation of the EU accession process remains a doubtful proposition.
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